SqORAM: Read-Optimized Sequential Write-Only Oblivious RAM by Chakraborti, Anrin & Sion, Radu
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
01
21
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  5
 Ju
l 2
01
7
SeqORAM: A Locality-Preserving Write-Only
Oblivious RAM
Anrin Chakraborti and Radu Sion
Stony Brook University
July 6, 2017
Abstract
Oblivious RAM technology has advanced rapidly. Under certain client-
side storage assumptions, tree-based ORAM designs [19] have achieved
established lower bounds even for online adversaries that can monitor
everything a client does.
Write-only ORAMs target a weaker but often more practical multi-
snapshot adversary that can monitor only user writes. This adversary is
typical in plausible deniability and censorship-resilient systems [5, 14].
But, although existing write-only ORAMs achieve significantly better
theoretical performance than traditional ORAMs, these gains do not ma-
terialize when deployed on real systems. This happens primarily due to
the random data placement strategies used to break correlations between
logical and physical namespaces – thus ensuring write “unlinkability”, a
required property. Random access performs poorly on both rotational
disks and SSDs, often increasing wear significantly, and interfering with
wear-leveling mechanisms.
In this work, we show how to achieve write “unlinkability” without
random data access. SeqORAM is a new locality-preserving write-only
ORAM. Data blocks close to each other in the logical domain land also
in close proximity on disk. A full-fledged Linux kernel-level implemen-
tation of SeqORAM is 100x faster than the state-of-the-art for standard
workloads.
1 Introduction
Dramatic advances in storage technology has resulted in users storing personal
(sensitive) information on portable devices (mobiles, laptops etc).
Unfortunately, the stored information becomes vulnerable to unauthorized
disclosures through attacks on the storage medium. “Drive snooping” – ei-
ther through a potentially untrusted software installed on the system [1] or as
firmware for the disk [3] – constantly monitors disk reads/writes and creates
user profiles on the basis of the information being accessed more frequently.
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Further, data privacy becomes significantly more important in the fight
against increasing censorship and intrusion by unfriendly powerful nation state
adversaries. There are numerous examples [14] of human rights activists being
coerced to provide access and encryption keys to oppresive regimes.
To ensure confidentiality, data can be encrypted in between accesses and
when written to disk. This however is not enough [11] because the sequence of
locations read and written leaks information regarding the user’s access pattern
and ultimately the contents of the stored data. This is especially important in
providing plausible deniability mechanisms [5, 6]
To mitigate this, oblivious RAMs (ORAM) are designed to allow a client
to hide data access patterns from an adversary monitoring a storage device
or unsecured RAM. Informally, the ORAM adversarial model ensures com-
putational indistinguishability between multiple equal-length query/access se-
quences. ORAMs also guarantee indistinguishability between reads and writes.
Although ORAMs provide an elegant solution for access privacy, they incur
very significant overheads, often prohibitive in practical scenarios for securing
local storage devices. Instead, a more common deployment scenario for ORAMs
is to secure network storage where high network latency “masks” the access over-
head inherent to ORAM designs. Thus, previous ORAM literature has largely
focused on minimizing network bandwidth requirements and reducing the num-
ber of round trips to the server required in order to complete an access. In this
regard, tree-based ORAM designs (such as PathORAM [19]) have achieved a
known lower bound on bandwidth under assuming significant client side stor-
age. Unfortunately, even in this case, ORAMs are impractical for deployment
for most applications.
Further, ORAMs protect against an online adversary that can monitor all
accesses. In practice this is often too strong when used for storage devices.
Instead, a multi-snapshot adversary [5, 6, 14] that can access and observe the
device after every write operation is of more interest.
The adversary can save and compare snapshots of the device, which may
include device state information and filesystem metadata. The typical example
involves customs officers at border crossings scanning a device under coercion,
or malware monitoring disk writes/updates.
To overcome this, Li et al. [13] introduced write-only ORAMs that only pro-
tect privacy of write operations. Subsequent work by Blass et al. [5] has shown
that write-only ORAMs can achieve significantly better performance when com-
pared to ORAMs with both read and write privacy guarantees.
[5] also shows how to achieve plausible deniability of stored data using write-
only ORAMs. Plausible deniability allows users to plausibly deny the existence
of certain data stored on their device, against an adversary that may access
and observe the device once (“single-snapshot”) or at multiple points in time
(“multi-snapshot”).
Unfortunately, existing write-only ORAMs are still orders of magnitude
slower than raw disks. For example, the state-of-the-art write-only ORAM,
HIVE-ORAM [5] is almost four orders of magnitude slower for both reads and
writes when compared to a SATA HDD and two orders of magnitude slower
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than SSDs.
The main cause of this performance penalty is an inherent random mapping
while placing of data from logical to physical domains. More specifically, existing
mechanisms such as HIVE-ORAM place logical data blocks in random physical
locations to break correlations – thus ensuring “unlinkability” of write opera-
tions, an important required property of ORAMs. However, it is well known
that random accesses can severely affect performance on both HDDs and SSDs.
Further, this random placement prohibits any performance gains derived from
modern filesystems optimized for sequential accesses.
In this paper, we introduce SeqORAM, a write-only ORAM that preserves
locality of accesses and is orders of magnitude faster than the existing state-of-
the-art.
SeqORAM is based on two key insights. First, instead of writing data to
random locations in order to break correlations between logical and physical
addresses, “unlinkability” can also be achieved by writing data in a canonical
form, i.e., sequentially at increasing physical block addresses independent of
their logical block addresses (similar to log-structured filesystems).
Second, to also speed up reads, data in blocks close together in the logical
block ID realm are placed as close as possible on disk, thus significantly increas-
ing locality and overall throughput when paired with modern locality-optimized
filesystems.
SeqORAM is implemented as a Linux kernel device mapper. When com-
pared with the state-of-the-art write-only ORAM [5], SeqORAM read and write
throughputs are orders of magnitude faster for sequential accesses and standard
workloads.
2 Related
ORAMs have been well-researched since the seminal work by Goldreich and Os-
trovsky [8]. ORAM constructions can be broadly classified into two categories:
pyramid-based and tree-based.
In ORAMs, data is structured as a set of N semantically-secure encrypted
blocks (with a secret key held by the client). Two operations are supported:
read(id) and write(id, value), where id is a logical identifier for the block being
accessed.
Pyramid based ORAM. Pyramid ORAMs organize data into levels with
each level exponentially larger than the other. The first pyramid based construc-
tion was provided by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [8] and achieves an amortized
communication complexity of O(log3N) data blocks per access and requires only
logarithmic storage at the client side.
For read, all levels are searched sequentially for the target block while writes
are always performed to the top level. Once a level becomes full, it is reshuffled
securely and written to the next level.
The most expensive step of the pyramid ORAM is the reshuffle. Various
mechanisms have been proposed to make the reshuffle more efficient. Williams
3
and Sion [4] show how to achieve an amortized construction with O(log2N)
communication complexity with O(
√
N) client storage using an oblivious merge
sort. Pinkas et al. [15] use cuckoo hashing and randomized shell sort [9] over the
original Goldreich and Ostrovsky solution [8] and achieve an amortized commu-
nication complexity of O(log2N) with constant client side storage. Goodrich
et al. [10] show how to de-amortize the original square root solution and hi-
erarchical solution [8] and achieve a worst-case complexity of O(logN)) in the
presence of O(nr) client side storage where r > 0. In [12], Kushilevitz et al.
use cuckoo hashing and rotating buffers to provide a de-amortized construction
of the original hierarchical solution [8] which achieves a worst-case communica-
tion complexity of O(log2N/loglogN). Unlike the de-amortization techniques
used in [10, 12] where each query performs an additional fixed amount of work
for the reshuffle, PD-ORAM [22] provides a way to de-amortize the level con-
struction with parallel clients that perform one (or more) level reshuffles in the
background.
Tree-based ORAM. In contrast to de-amortized ORAM constructions, tree-
based ORAMs are naturally un-amortized (the worst-case query cost is equal
to the average cost). A tree-based ORAM organizes the data as a binary (or
ternary) tree. Each node of the tree is a bucket which can contain multiple
blocks. Usually a block is randomly mapped to a leaf in the tree. The ORAMs
maintain the following invariant: a block mapped to a leaf resides in any one of
the buckets on the path from the root to the leaf to which the block is mapped.
The position map which maps blocks to leaves is either stored on the client
(O(N) client storage) or recursively on the server for O(1) client side storage at
the cost of O(log2N) increase in communication complexity.
To access a particular block, a client downloads all the buckets (or one
element from each bucket) along the path from the root to the leaf to which the
block is mapped. Once the block has been read, it is remapped to a new leaf
and evicted back to the tree. Various eviction procedures have been proposed
[7, 16, 17, 19, 20] optimizing either bandwidth or the number of round trips or
both.
Write-only ORAM Li et al. [13] proposed the first write-only ORAM scheme
with an amortized write complexity of O(B × logN) where B is the block size
of the ORAM and N is the number of blocks in the ORAM. Read complexity
is O(N) without O(N) local storage.
Blass et al. [5] designed a constant time write-only ORAM scheme assuming
an O(logN) sized stash stored in memory (HIVE-ORAM). It maps data from a
logical address space uniformly randomly to the physical blocks on the underly-
ing device. The position map containing this mapping is then recursively stored
in O(logN) smaller ORAMs, a standard technique introduced in [18]. The re-
cursive technique reduces the logical block access complexity for the position
map by storing the position map blocks in logical blocks of smaller sizes. Under
this assumption, HIVE-ORAM [5] accesses a constant number of logical blocks
at the cost of some overflow that is stored in the in-memory stash.
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3 Model
Deployment. Data originating from a logical volume (which may support a
filesystem on top) is written encrypted to a storage device (either local disk or
network storage).
Adversary. The main write-only ORAM adversary is a multi-snapshot adver-
sary that can access the storage device after one or more write operations.
The adversary may save device snapshots – including device specific infor-
mation, filesystem metadata and bits stored in each block – and compare these
snapshots with the current state in an attempt to learn about the location of
the written information. The adversary does not however monitor device reads
or accesses to client DRAM in between writes to the main device.
Write access patterns. Access patterns are informally defined as an ordered
sequence of logical block writes.
Write traces. Write trace are informally defined as the actual modifications
to physical blocks due to the execution of a corresponding access pattern.
Security. SeqORAM uses the security model from [5]. Informally, a write-only
ORAM is secure if it provides write access pattern indistinguishability against a
computationally bounded adversary. Write access pattern indistinguishability
has been formally [5] defined as:
For a device with N physical blocks, given two access patterns of equal
length O0 = {a1, a2, . . . , ai} and O1 = {b1, b2, . . . , bi} and a random write trace,
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wi} with wi ∈ N , O0 is said to be indistinguishable from O1
iff. there exists a function ǫ, negligible in the security parameter s such that
Pr[W|O0]− Pr[W|O1] < ǫ(s)
Here Pr[W|Oi], i = 0, 1 is the probability that W is the sequence of writes
caused to the disk by executing Oi.
Minimizing I/O latency. A main goal of SeqORAM is to reduce the latency
of access for each ORAM operation and specifically the number of disk seeks
per access.
Note that this is orthogonal to the typical ORAM performance metrics which
involve just optimizing the bandwidth per access. Optimizing bandwidth is
important when ORAMs are deployed in networks but seeks tend to dominate
for local storage.
Logical vs. physical complexity. Existing ORAMs define access complexity
as the number of logical blocks of data accessed per I/O. This allows optimza-
tions by using logical blocks of smaller size [18, 19]. However, it is important
to note that standard off-the-shelf storage block-based storage device can ac-
cess data only in units of physical blocks (sectors). For example, accessing a
256 byte logical block still entails accessing the corresponding 4KB disk block
from the disk. Thus, in the context of locally-deployed block-based devices, it
is important to also measure the complexity of the physical block accesses per
ORAM I/O.
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State-of-the-art. The most bandwidth-efficient write-only ORAM to date is
HIVE-ORAM [5]. It has a physical block read complexity (number of physical
blocks read) of O(logβN) and a physical write complexity (number of blocks
written) of O(log2βN) where β = B/|addr|, B is the physical block size in bytes
and |addr| is the size of one physical block address in bytes.
4 Overview and Amortized Construction
We introduce first an amortized construction. In further sections we then show
how to deamortize efficiently.
Not unlike pyramid-based ORAMs [21, 22], SeqORAM organizes N data
blocks into logical levels, each exponentially larger in size than the previous.
Levels are stored sequentially to disk – i.e., level i is written to the disk entirely
before level i+ 1.
Each level is divided into buckets, each of which contains β fixed-sized blocks.
Level i has ki buckets, where k is a constant fixed at initialization. The last
level has N/β buckets. Consequently, the number of logical levels is logk(N/B)
(Figure 1).
In-memory storage. In addition to disk storage, SeqORAM has memory
sufficient to hold a constant (c) number of buckets. This is used for performing
in-memory bucket merges during level reconstruction (described further).
Invariant. SeqORAM ensures the following two invariants:
1. All blocks in a level are written to disk in ascending order of their their
logical blocks addresses.
2. The most recent version of a block is the first one found when ORAM
levels are searched sequentially in increasing order of their level number.
Writes. SeqORAM performs data block writes to an in-memory write queue.
The queue is of the size of a bucket. All blocks are encrypted randomized
(semantically secure) before being written to the write queue. Once the write
queue fills up (after β writes), its blocks are sorted on the basis of their logical
block addresses and flushed to disk (into the ORAM top level bucket).
Merge. Further, once the write queue fills up and the top level of the ORAM
is also full, SeqORAM performs a merge on the buckets in the queue and the
top level to create the second level. To this end, first, the blocks in the write
queue are sorted on their logical addresses. Then, the (already sorted) top level
bucket is read into memory. Finally, the two sorted buckets are merged, their
blocks reencrypted and written sequentially to buckets in the second level on
disk. Note that we need to read the top level into memory to avoid having to
seek on disk during the merge.
In general, once all the buckets in level i have been filled up, they are merged
with the blocks already in level i+1. This requires reading one bucket each from
level i and level i + 1, merging them in memory and writing back the merged
6
Figure 1: SeqORAM Layout. There are logk(N/B) levels. Each level contains
k buckets with β data blocks. Levels are stored sequentially to disk. Each level
has a B+ tree map to quickly map logical IDs to blocks within the level.
bucket to level i + 1. More specifically, SeqORAM initializes two bucket-sized
queues in memory corresponding to level i and level i+1. Then, blocks are read
sequentially from the two levels to their respective queues. Once the two queues
are full, SeqORAM retrieves a block each from both the queues, compares their
logical addresses and writes back the block with the lower logical address to
level i+ 1. This continues until β block have been written sequentially to level
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i – thus filling up a bucket.
Note that if the queues contain duplicates then the block in level i will be
written (as it is more recent) and the block in level i + 1 will be discarded. If
at any stage the queues become empty before writing β blocks to level i + 1,
then fake blocks (such as containing reencryptions of zero) are written instead.
Subsequently, the queues are again filled up using blocks read sequentially from
the two corresponding levels and the process is repeated to write the next sorted
bucket to level i+ 1.
A caveat here is that since the outcome of a merge is not trivially predictable,
SeqORAM cannot determine the number of blocks that will be left in each queue
after writing β blocks to level i+ 1. Thus, the bucket in level i+ 1 that will be
written next as a result of the merge, may not have been read entirely to the
corresponding queue yet. In this case, the remaining data blocks in the bucket
will be overwritten as a result of the new writes.
To mitigate this, SeqORAM copies the existing blocks from the bucket that
have not been read yet for the merge to the next bucket, before writing blocks
from the queue. For example, consider that some blocks in bucket b have not
yet been read to memory for the merge although b − 1 buckets have already
been written to level i + 1. Then, before writing new blocks to b, SeqORAM
copies the remaining blocks in b to bucket b+ 1 while also reading the contents
of b + 1 entirely to memory. For indistinguishability, β blocks (either real or
fake) are always written to bucket b+1 even when no blocks need to be copied
which prevents an adversary from learning the number of blocks copied from
b to b + 1. Thus, an adversary only observes two sequentially placed buckets
being written together at each step of the merge.
Tracking blocks that haven’t been read for a merge from a level can be
achieved trivially by initializing a counter when the level merge begins and
incrementing with each block write. Since, blocks are always read sequentially
for merges, the counter value will point exactly to the block that needs to be
enqueued next.
Note that merging levels in this way does not require reading the entire levels
into memory – instead only the two bucket-sized queues and one additional
bucket from level i+ 1 need to be stored in memory as discussed above. If the
level is empty, then the level i blocks are copied directly since they are already
sorted.
The last level – which contains N/β buckets, and can thus store all N blocks
– is organized in a slightly more complex fashion. Blocks there are placed at
an offset determined by their logical address, independent of the other blocks.
Specifically, a block with logical block address j is always placed at the jth
offset, located in the j/βth bucket. The presence of other blocks does not affect
the location of a block in the last level. This allows bounding the ORAM height.
It also provides the opportunity to merge duplicate blocks. Since the last level
can contain all N blocks, blocks that are in the last level can be overwritten by
more updated copies in the second to last level, during level merge.
The merge protocol described above ensures invariant 1 straightforwardly
since periodic level reconstructions ensure that each level contain blocks in in-
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Figure 2: Layout of the map B+ tree on the disk. While β leaf nodes are written
sequentially to the disk, a parent node is created in memory and updated with
the value of the maximum logical block address per leaf node. Once the parent
node has β entries corresponding to the β leaf nodes, it is written to the disk
sequentially after the leaf nodes. The tree is built recursively in this bottom up
fashion.
creasing order of their logical block addresses. For invariant 2, new writes/updated
copies of blocks are always written first to the write queue and move down se-
quentially through the levels due to level reconstructions. Consequently, the
most updated copy of a block will be encountered first while searching through
the ORAM levels sequentially. As we describe below, reads in SeqORAM do
not trigger additional writes as in case of full ORAMs [8] and thus do not affect
the invariant.
Level maps. To read a block from a particular level, it is necessary to first
determine the bucket in which the block resides currently. As described above,
each level contains blocks sorted on the logical block ID. To make retrieval of
blocks from the sorted levels efficient, SeqORAM maintains a per-level map at
a pre-allocated location on the disk (Figure 1).
The per level map is stored as a B+ tree. Each node of the B+ tree is stored
in a physical block. The keys stored in the internal nodes of the B+ tree are
logical block addresses while the values at the leaves are buckets in a level in
which the corresponding blocks are currently present. More specifically, each
leaf node entry is a tuple < logical address, bucket number > and the entries
are sorted by logical address. Fake blocks are represented by sentinel values in
the leaf node.
Since, each leaf node is written to an individual physical block, and each
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entry in the leaf node is of a fixed size (since logical and physical block address
sizes are fixed), the number of entries that can fit in a leaf node can be precisely
determined. Let B be the physical block size and |addr| the size of an address
(tuple in the leaf node). Then, sizing a bucket to contain β = B/|addr| blocks
ensures that all these blocks have entries within the same leaf node (of size B).
Now, level i in the ORAM has ki × β blocks. To determine the height of
the map B+ tree for the level, note that each leaf of the tree contains β tuples.
With each tuple then corresponding to a block, the number of leaves in the B+
tree for level i is ki. Consequently, the height of the map B+tree (with fanout
β) for level i is logβ(k
i) = O(logβN). For a 1TB disk with 4KB blocks and
64-bit addresses, β = 256 and logβN = 4.
Map construction. The B+ tree map for a level is constructed simultaneously
with the level construction. When a new bucket is written to a level (after a
merge), the corresponding leaf node is of the tree is written as well with the
logical addresses and bucket numbers. Once β buckets have been written, a
parent node of the β leaf node is created in memory with an entry for the
maximum of the logical block addresses in the β leaf nodes (Figure 2). Once
the parent node has β entries, the parent node is written to the disk as well.
In this way, the tree is constructed in a bottom-up manner with parent nodes
being completely created in memory before being written to the disk. Note that
this requires logβ(N) blocks of memory in order to create the parent nodes.
Reads. SeqORAM performs reads by searching each level in the ORAM
sequentially for the block using the map B+tree for that level. If the block
address is found in the map for a level, the block is retrieved from that level.
Retrieving a particular block from a level thus requires traversing the map
B+tree for that level according to the required logical block ID and then re-
trieving the block from the bucket. This requires logβ(k
i) + 1 block accesses.
Recall that the entire bucket does not have to be retrieved since the location
of a block within the bucket can be determined as the leaf entries are already
sorted on logical block addresses.
Moreover, since the adversary does not monitor reads, reading subsequent
levels after a block has been found at a particular level is not necessary. Recall
that the most updated copy of a block is found first while searching through the
ORAM levels sequentially as ensured by invariant 2. This is in contrast to full
pyramid based ORAM designs where all levels must be visited by the search
(either through real access or dummy accesses) to ensure that an adversary also
monitoring reads does not learn the level where a block has been found. Also
note that unlike full pyramid ORAM designs, the block read is not removed from
the level it has been read from and/or added to the top level of the ORAM.
Amortized access complexity. The write access complexity of the above
described construction can be amortized over the level construction. First, note
that during construction of level i+ 1, ki buckets in level i are merged with ki
buckets already in level i+1. Also, during merges all buckets in level i and level
i+ 1 have to be read exactly once from the disk while ki+1 buckets are written
exactly twice (due to copies from previous buckets). Further, constructing the
10
B+tree map requires writing 2 ∗ ki blocks. Level construction for level i can
thus be performed with O(ki) accesses.
Since each level is exponentially larger than the previous level, level i is
constructed only after ki×β writes. The amortized write access complexity can
then be derived as
logkN/B∑
i=0
O(ki)
ki−1×β = O(logkN)
Note that reads cannot be amortized similar to writes, since reads do not
result in writes to the ORAM and subsequent level reconstructions. Instead,
the read access complexity is O(logkN × logβN) since to read a block, the B+
tree map at each level is traversed to locate the level at which the block exists.
In later sections we describe a method to reduce the read access complexity.
Seek time analysis. As detailed before, a major metric for evaluation of
SeqORAM is the number of seeks per I/O. The following details an analysis
of the amortized number of seeks as part of the write operations. Note that
since individual writes are made to the in memory write queue, and flushing
the write queue triggers level reconstructions, the analysis is based on the seeks
during level reconstructions. Writing contents of write queue to the top level
fortunately requires only 1 seek since all the contents of the sorted write queue
is written sequentially.
Consider the level reconstruction for level i. For the merge at leastM > 2×β
blocks of memory is required – to store two buckets entirely, and compare them
in linear time. With ki buckets at the ith level, the level overflows k times into
the (i+ 1)th level before the (i+ 1)th level overflows.
Now, when level i overflows into the i+1th level the jth time with j < k, the
number of buckets accessed includes reading ki−1 buckets in level i that need
to be merged and j × ki−1 buckets that are currently occupied in level i + 1,
and writing back (j + 1)× ki−1 buckets. To summarize, the number of buckets
accessed when level i overflows into level i + 1 the jth time is ki−1 + jki−1 +
(j + 1)ki−1.
Further, buckets within levels are stored sequentially on the disk – thus
buckets can be read entirely to the memory sequentially without additional
seeks. Consequently, reading a bucket requires only 1 seek.
The number seeks for all level reconstructions amortized over the number of
writes can then be calculated as follows –
s =
logkN/B∑
i=0
k∑
j=1
ki−1+jki−1+(j+1)ki−1
jki−1β
This can be finally reduced to
s = 2logk(N/β)(k+1)β
An important point to be noted is that the above analysis considers 1 seek
per each bucket that is read/written per level reconstruction. This is under the
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constraint that only 2 buckets can be merged at the same time with allocated
memory, M = 2β. A key observation here is that in case multiple buckets could
be allocated in memory, then merges could be performed with lesser number
of seeks. For instance, if ki buckets could be read to memory at the same
time, then level i could be read entirely to memory using 1 disk seek for the
merge since all buckets are already sorted within the level. Therefore, with more
allocated memory, the amortized number of seeks can be optimized further. In
fact, if the memory allocated can hold 2× c buckets (that is M = 2×β× c), the
amortized seek time reduces by a factor of c. Thus, the amortized seek time in
this case is
s = 2logk(N/β)(k+1)β×c
Setting β > k+1 and c = O(logN), we get a constant amortized number of
seeks per write. For example, actual memory required to be allocated for the
merge with 4KB blocks and 1TB disk is M = 2 × 2(3)(30) = 360 4KB blocks,
or around 2MB of memory. This is reasonable for current memory-rich systems
with at least 2GB of DRAM to support modern operating systems.
Comparison with existing work. In comparison to the state-of-the-art,
Hive-ORAM [5] which has a physical write access complexity of O(log2N),
the write access complexity of the construction presented above is O(logN),
amortized over the number of writes. The average number of seeks for Hive-
ORAM [5] is O(log2)N since each write is to a random location. In contrast,
as shown above the amortized number of seeks for the construction described
above is a constant in the presence of O(logN) memory. Interestingly, Hive-
ORAM [5] also requires an O(logN) sized in-memory stash to store blocks that
could not be written to the disk. The read complexity of Hive-ORAM [5] is
O(logβN).
Lemma 1. The amortized SeqORAM construction provides write access pattern
indistinguishability.
Proof (sketch): The proof follows straighforwardly by construction. Given two
equal length access patterns, A = w1, w2, . . . wi and B = x1, x2, . . . xi, i en-
crypted writes are first added to the write queue irrespective the logical ad-
dresses. When the write queue is flushed, it triggers level reconstructions inde-
pendent of the contents of the write queue.
During the level reconstructions, blocks from two buckets are merged to-
gether on the basis of their logical addresses. Since reads are not observable,
the buckets that are being merged are not known to the adversary. The order in
which the merged buckets are written is independent of the result of the merge.
More specifically, during a merge for level i, an adversary observes buckets al-
ways written in the order of 1 to ki irrespective of the contents of the buckets.
Since, blocks are written reencrypted during a merge, the semantic security of
the encryption scheme provides indistinguishability between the blocks written
to a bucket after the merge. Thus, observing write traces for i subsequent writes,
an adversary can only do negligibly better than purely guessing whether A or
B was executed.
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5 Deamortized Construction
Although the amortized construction in Section 4 achieves appreciable perfor-
mance incentives over [5] by reducing the amortized write access complexity
and number of seeks per write, it also suffers from two major drawbacks: i)
the read access complexity is higher and ii) the worst case write access com-
plexity is O(N) (required to reconstruct the last level). In general, due to the
high worst case costs, amortized constructions perform poorly as part of exist-
ing systems optimized. For example, level reconstruction especially for larger
levels will require blocking I/O for significant periods of time before the level
is created entirely, lest consistency is sacrificed. This results in violating I/O
timeout for modern operating systems and significantly degrades I/O perfor-
mance. To make SeqORAM usable in practice, the goal is to deploy SeqORAM
without modifying the other layers in the system. In order to achieve this, first
a deamortized version of SeqORAM is presented with the same write access
complexity and low average number of seeks per write. Then, we describe a
mechanism to reduce the read access complexity.
5.1 Deamortization
Previous work [10, 12, 22] has explored various mechanisms to deamortize full
pyramid ORAMs by leveraging extra space. All these mechanisms work by
performing a fixed portion of the level construction as part of each query. How-
ever, as noted in [22], level construction involves multiple subtasks with different
completion times. Thus, achieving deamortization in this way only ensures that
each query takes roughly the same amount of time by monitoring progress over
subtasks and forcing query progress to be proportional to level construction [22].
In contrast, the idea presented here is to achieve strict deamortization which
ensures that each write performs exactly the same amount of work and have
identical completion time.
Organization. As in [10, 12], the idea here is to use extra space per level to
continue writes while reshuffling. First, instead of using a variable branching
factor for the number of buckets in a level, k is fixed at 2 – i.e., level i has 2i
buckets. Then, each bucket in a level (except for the last level) is duplicated –
the original set of buckets is denoted as generation 0 buckets while the duplicated
set is denoted as generation 1 buckets. Finally, the entire level (both generation
0 and generation 1) buckets are duplicated to form a secondary buffer. Level i
thus contains two buffers each with 2i+1 buckets – 2i buckets per generation as
shown in Figure 4. The last level is not duplicated and contains only one buffer
with N/β buckets as in the amortized construction from Section 4.
SeqORAM ensures that each generation is individually sorted. Buckets in
generation 0 and the corresponding buckets in generation 1 are merged to form
the next level. The buffers are used alternatively for merging levels (denoted
as the merge buffer) or for writes from the previous level (denoted as the write
buffer). More specifically, when generation 0 and generation 1 buckets in level
i − 1 are merged, the resulting buckets are written to the buckets in the write
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Figure 3: Deamortization example for 3 levels. In (a) and (b), buckets in the
merge buffer of level 1 are merged to form generation 0 of level 2 while writes
from the write queue are 1 to the write buffer in level 1. Once generation 0 in
write buffer in level 2 has been written (and the merge in the merge buffer of
level 1 has been completed), the buffers are switched. In (c) and (d), the merge
in level 0 creates generation 1 of level 2 while writes are performed to the write
buffer.
Figure 4: Level design for the deamortized construction. Each level has two
buffers with two generations. In this example, level i has two buffers with two
generations each with 2i buckets.
buffer of level i. Once, the write buffer is full (level i − 1 has been merged
twice), the write buffer is used as the merge buffer for level i and the buckets
are merged to be written to level i+ 1. After the merge is complete, the merge
buffer becomes the write buffer for subsequent writes from level i− 1.
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Merge. Figure 3 shows a demonstrative example of the deamortization tech-
nique. At a high level, after writing the contents of the write queue to the top
level, one new bucket is written to all other levels. In the example, for level 1,
generation 0 and generation 1 buckets from the merge buffer are merged while
the write from the write queue is performed on the write buffer (Figure 3(a)).
The buckets in the merge buffer are merged to form generation 0 buckets of
level 2 (Figure 3(a,b)), thus ensuring that generation 0 is sorted.
The merge in level 1 completes once all buckets in generation 0 of the write
buffer in level 2 has been written. Next, the buffers are switched for level
1 (Figure 3 (c)). The buckets in the merge buffer now are merged to form
generation 0 of level 2 (Figure 3(c,d)). Note that after the switch, the previous
merge buffer in level 1 is used for subsequent writes from the write queue. Since,
the data in the buffer has already been merged and written to level 2 entirely
previously (Figure 3(a,b)), the data can be safely overwritten by the new writes.
Buckets from level 2 are merged similarly to form level 3 (partially shown in
Figure 3). Thus, deamortization is performed by merging two buckets from each
level to be written to the next level while one bucket is written to the level after
merging buckets from the previous level. Similar to the amortized construction
if during a merge of two buckets β real writes cannot be made to the merged
bucket, fake blocks are added instead.
Note that during a merge, there will be duplicate contents in the merge
buffer of level i − 1 and the write buffer of level i. More specifically, the write
buffer of level i will contain the same blocks as in the merge buffer of level i−1,
organized differently due to the merge. Only after all the block from the merge
buffer in level i − 1 have been written to level i, the buffers will be switched
and the blocks in the merge buffer will be overwritten by new writes from level
i − 2. This is an important detail for the construction since this allows blocks
to be read from the merge buffer of level i − 1 even while the blocks are being
merged and written to the write buffer of level i, which is not entirely formed
at this time. In 0 of this, SeqORAM would need to search in both the merge
buffer for of level i− 1 and the write buffer of level i for a block while the merge
is not complete.
This is because it is not possible to trivially predict the outcome of a merge
of two buckets. For example, it is possible for two buckets from the merge buffer
to be merged in a way that results in neither of the buckets being completely
empty after the merge. Fortunately, the existence of these duplicate blocks does
not violate consistency since during reads, level i−1 will be checked for the block
before level i and the search will stop once the block is found.
Merge to last level. Recall that the last level is not duplicated and contains
N/β buckets to hold all N blocks. Thus, after merging the second to last level,
the blocks are written to last level at offsets determined directly by the logical
block addresses. More specifically, as in the amortized construction (Section 4),
block with logical address j is written to the jth physical block in the last level.
In addition, when the merge is performed, the buckets are still written in the
increasing sequential order as detailed below. If a bucket does not contain any
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entries as a result of the merge, it is reencrypted and written back. This prevents
an adversary from learning the actual number of empty buckets in the last level
– which leaks the amount of actual data in the ORAM. Indistinguishability
between real modification and reencryption due to semantic security ensures
that the adversary cannot determine whether a bucket is empty.
To achieve this, when the generation 0 and generation 1 buckets in the merge
buffer of the second to last level (each containingN/2β buckets) are merged, two
buckets in the last level are written/reencrypted in sequentially increasing order.
This ensures that by the time the N/2β buckets in the second to last level are
merged, all N/β buckets in the last level have been written/reencrypted. Note
that this trivially ensures that duplicates in the last level are overwritten by
copies in the second to last level.
Correctness. The correctness of the mechanism follows from the fact that
buckets in the merge buffer are completely merged and written to the next level
before the write buffer is full. Note that each buffer has the same number of
buckets and the rate at which buckets are merged and written to the next level
is the same as the rate at which buckets are filled in the write buffer. More
specifically, while one bucket is emptied from the merge buffer of a level, one
bucket is written to the write buffer of the same level.
Reads. Since each generation in a level is individually sorted, level maps need
to be maintained for each generation. Consequently each level has 4 B+ trees –
2 B+ trees per generation in each buffer. Also, while searching for a block in a
level, the trees need to be checked for the most updated location of the block.
The order in which the trees are traversed for a block is as follows: i) generation
1 in the write buffer, ii) generation 0 in the write buffer, iii) generation 1 in the
merge buffer, and iv) generation 0 in the merge buffer.
This order ensures that the most updated copy of the block is found first.
First, if either of the generations in the write buffer is not completely full at a
level, the block will found in the merge buffer of the previous level as discussed
above. If a generation in the write buffer is completely full, then it contains the
most recent copy of the block since the contents of the write buffer have been
written as a result of the last merge from the previous level and the current
merge buffer in that level has already been checked previously. If the block
is not in the write buffer then the merge buffer is checked with generation 1
buckets being checked before generation 0 buckets as they were written more
recently. Thus, although the asymptotic read complexity for this construction is
still O(logβN× logN), the constant increases by a factor of 4 over the amortized
construction in Section 4.
Write access complexity. One bucket is written to each level after the write
queue has been filled. Since the write queue is the same size as the buckets,
the overall write access complexity is O(logN). Effectively, the deamortization
converts an an O(logN) amortized constructions described in Section 4 with a
worst case of O(N) to an O(logN) worst case construction.
Number of seeks. Note that a bucket is written to each level after the write
queue has been filled. Writing each bucket requires one seek. Thus, O(logN)
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Figure 5: Access time map (ATM) traversal in the ORAM levels. Map blocks are
placed together with the data blocks in the levels. Once the level is determined
corresponding to each node along an ATM path, the level map is used to retrieve
the node.
seeks are performed after β writes (size of the write queue). If β > O(logN),
the number of seeks per write is less than 1. This is a reasonable assumption
since for a 1TB disk, logN = 30 and β = 256 for standard 4KB disk blocks and
64 bit block addresses.
5.2 Efficient Reads
The deamortized construction described above features a read complexity of
O(logβN × logN). This is because to find a particular block logN levels must
be checked sequentially until the block is found and checking each level requires
traversing the map B+ tree per level with height of O(logβN). Further, in the
worst case 4 B+tree needs to be traversed per level as discussed above. This is
significantly worse than the O(logβN) read complexity for HIVE-ORAM [5].
The additional read complexity for the construction is the result of checking
all logN levels in the worst case in order to locate a particular block. In contrast,
[5] stores a position map to indicate the physical location of each logical block.
The position map is stored recursively in O(logN) smaller ORAMs.
Unfortunately, it is non-trivial to track the precise location of each block in
SeqORAM since the physical block where a logical block is currently stored in
a level depends on the other blocks present in the sorted levels. However, it is
possible to correctly predict the level in which a block is present. The insight
here is that ORAM writes trigger level reconstructions deterministically – the
number of accesses required to complete merging all buckets in the merge buffer
of a level and writing to the write buffer of the next level depends only on the
number of buckets in the next level. Further, each flush from the write queue
is followed by writing exactly one bucket at each level. So the number of write
queue flushes required before the write buffer of a level is full and consequently
the merge in the previous level is complete can be precisely determined.
Then, the level in which a block is currently present can be precisely deter-
mined by comparing the value of a global counter counting the number of times
the write queue has been flushed since the ORAM was initialized and the last
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access time for the block (mechanism detailed below). The last access time for
each block is the value of the global counter when the block was flushed from
the write queue. This mechanism allows checking only one level per block read
thus reducing the asymptotic read access complexity by O(logN).
Tracking levels for reads. Consider a block with logical address x that was
last accessed when the value of the global access counter was c. Also, let the
current value of the global counter be g. Now, recall that exactly one bucket
is written to the write buffer in level i + 1 after merging two buckets in level i
while one bucket is written to the write buffer of level i from level i − 1. Once
all buckets in write buffer in level i (2i+1 buckets) are full, all the buckets in the
merge buffer have been merged and written to a generation in the write buffer of
level i + 1 (2i+1 buckets). Thus, the merge buffer now contains duplicates and
can be discarded.
Importantly, this implies that the total occupancy of level i in terms of
number of filled buckets (with either real or fake blocks) never exceeds 2i+1 i.e.,
2i buckets per each generation. In fact, the number of logically occupied buckets
is always maintained at 2i+1 since new writes to the write buffer is performed
at the same rate as merges (and subsequently writing to the next level) on the
merge buffer. Given g and c, it is then possible to determine i such that
i−1∑
j=1
2j+1 < g − c <
i∑
j=1
2j+1
If N < g − c, then x is in the last level. Recall that in the last level x will
be at a location determined only by its logical block address and thus can be
retrieved trivially.
The above equation determines the number of levels that have been filled
with new data after x has been written. Now, x can be in either of the three
following buffers: i) x can be in the merge buffer of level i, ii) x can be in the
write buffer of level i and iii) x can be in the merge buffer of level i − 1 if the
merge hasn’t completed.
Identifying buffers. To identify the correct buffer in which x exists, it is
first necessary to determine the number of buckets in the write buffer of level
i that was empty when x was written. Since the write buffer of a level fills up
periodically as a function of the number of new buckets written (write queue
flushes), the number of empty buckets can be calculated as follows. For level i
with a write buffer size of 2i+1 buckets, the write buffer fills up after every 2i+1
write queue flushes. Thus, when x was written val = c%2i+1 is the number of
buckets already completely filled in the write buffer of level i.
Now consider that r buckets were written new to level i after x. This can
be calculate as
r = g − c−
i−1∑
j=1
2j+1.
After x was flushed from the write queue, it subsequently moved down the
levels as result of more flushes until it reached level i. This required g − c − r
18
write queue flushes. As a result of g−c−r bucket writes, the number of buckets
in the write buffer of level i that were filled can be determined as
b = (val + g − c− r)%2i+1
At this stage, the r buckets which includes x were written to the write buffer
of level i. Thus, if b+ r > 2i+1, then x will in the merge buffer of level i because
the r bucket writes resulted in the write buffer being full. Otherwise, x is in the
write buffer. Further, if b < 2i then x has been written to generation 0 in the
write buffer since this implies that generation 0 was not full when x was merged
and written from the merge buffer in level i − 1. Otherwise, x is in generation
1.
Now, when writes to generation 1 in the write buffer of level i starts, the
buckets in the merge buffer for level i−1 is discarded/overwritten. The buckets
in generation 0 of the write buffer of level i now contains all buckets that were
part of the previous merge buffer in level i − 1. To determine if generation 0
buckets are full in level i, it is enough to check if b + r > 2i. If true, x can be
found in generation 0 of the write buffer. Otherwise, x is still part of the merge
buffer in level i − 1.
To summarize, using the mechanism described above, SeqORAM can cor-
rectly predict the level number, the buffer and the generation in which a block
x currently resides. This allows SeqORAM to check only one level
Access time map (ATM). SeqORAM stores an access time map (ATM)
for efficiently tracking the last access time of a block. The ATM is stored as
a B+ tree (not to be confused with the per level map B+ tree) within the
same address space as the data blocks. Specifically, each node of the B+ tree
is assigned a logical address within the same address space as the data blocks.
Each leaf node of the B+ tree stores a tuple < l addr, last access ctr > where
l addr is the logical address of a block and last access ctr is the value of the
global access counter when the block was last written to the write queue. Recall
that the global access counter tracks the number of times the write queue has
been flushed since the ORAM initialization. Each leaf node is stored in one disk
block. The number of entries that can fit in a disk block depends on the size
of the tuple. Assuming 64 bit logical addresses and last access counter values,
the number of entries in a block can also be fixed as β (as defined before).
Consequently, the height of the tree is logβN with a fanout of β.
The leaf nodes themselves are then ordered from left to right on the basis of
the logical address – the leftmost leaf node has entries for logical block addresses
1 to β while the rightmost leaf node has entries for addresses N−β to N . Thus,
it is straightforward to determine the path in the tree corresponding to an entry
for a particular block address since the leaf node containing the entry can be
determined using the block address only. Each internal node contains a tuple
that keeps track of the < logical address, last access ctr > values of its children
nodes. Thus, the tree can be traversed by determining the levels at which the
nodes on a path of the tree currently exists using the mechanism described
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Figure 6: (a) Writing a path of the ATM in the write queue after updating the
path corresponding to an updated data block. (b) The state of the write queue
when random data blocks are written and the corresponding ATM paths do not
intersect. (c) State of the write queue when logically sequential data blocks are
written. Only one path common to all the data blocks needs to the be updated
for the ATM.
above. Figure 5 shows a schematic diagram of the way in which a path in the
map can be traversed in the ORAM using the access counter values.
Reads. For a data block read, the corresponding path in the ATM is
traversed to determine the level and the buffer at which the block is currently
present. For traversing the path, the map B+ tree at logβN levels are searched
and the nodes along the path that are currently stored in that level are retrieved.
Finally, using the access counter value for the required data block stored at the
leaf node, the level at which the block currently exists is determined and the
block is retrieved from that level using the map B+ tree for that level. Since the
height of the map B+ tree at all levels is O(logβN), the overall read complexity
of the construction is O(log2βN). Thus, the ATM reduces the read complexity of
the deamortized construction from O(logβN× logN) to O(log2βN) with β >> 2.
Updating the ATM. If a data block is to be updated, then the path in the
tree is also updated with the new access time. In this case, the ATM blocks
on the path read is updated with the new access counters and are written to
the write queue along with the updated data block. Figure 6(a) shows how the
nodes along a path in the tree is updated and written after the updated data
block in the write queue.
A point to note is that each write of a data block is followed by writing
the corresponding path in the ATM that it needs to update. Thus, the actual
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number of data blocks that can be written to the write queue before a flush
(and consequently the overall write throughput) reduces by a factor equal to
the height of the ATM (Figure 6(b)).
Fortunately, exploiting sequentiality in logical blocks written together, al-
lows optimizing the throughput by writing nodes common to the ATM path
corresponding to multiple writes only once. For example, in Figure 6(c), if all
the data blocks in the write queue have entries within the same leaf node of the
ATM, then the updated nodes on the corresponding path can be written only
once after all the data writes have been completed. This reduces the overhead
of writing the same path multiple times. Since, the height of the tree, logβN
is small (4 for a 1TB database with β = 256), writing 4 map blocks instead of
data blocks in a write queue of size β = 256 leads to minimal reduction in over-
all throughput. Thus, for sequential write accesses, SeqORAM achieves higher
write throughput than for random write accesses.
Effect of Caching. Caching can dramatically improve read throughput
by avoiding seeks in between sequential reads. In this case, using a cache of
O(logβN) blocks for storing a path of the ATM allows optimizing the number
of nodes that need to be accessed for the next read. If the next read is sequential
and has the logical block address within the leaf node in the cache, the ATM
traversal to locate the level for the block can be completely avoided. In fact,
with purely sequential access, this brings down the overall read complexity to
O(logbN) (to access the B+ tree in the corresponding level) since an O(logbN)
sized ATM path is required to be read only after every β accesses (the size of
the leaf node in the cache) with β >> logβN .
Lemma 2. The deamortized SeqORAM construction provides write access pat-
tern indistinguishability.
Proof (sketch): The deamortized construction makes two changes to the amor-
tized construction: an extra buffer is added to each level and the ATM is stored
within the ORAM. First, the merging in this case proceeds deterministically
and independent of the blocks being merged – buckets in generation 0 of the
write buffer of a level are written sequentially before the buckets in generation 1.
Once the write buffer is full, it is switched to the merge buffer. Note that buck-
ets are only read from the merge buffer and merged in memory. Since reads are
not observable and buckets written after the merge are encrypted with semantic
security, the outcome of the merge is not determinable by an adversary.
Further, since reads are not observable, using the ATM during reads to re-
duce the number of levels searched for a block does not provide any additional
information to the adversary. Finally, the ATM blocks are written to the write
queue indistinguishably from data blocks due to semantic security of the en-
cryption.
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Figure 7: Sequential read and write throughputs for different I/O sizes.
Throughputs are in logarithmic scale while I/O size is in MB. Higher is better.
6 Evaluation
Implementation. SeqORAM has been implemented as kernel module device
mapper, a Linux based framework for mapping blocks in logical volumes to
physical blocks. The default cipher used for encryption is AES-CTR (256 bit)
with individual per-block random IVs. IVs are stored in a pre-allocated location
on disk. Underlying hardware blocks are 512 bytes each and 8 adjacent hardware
blocks constitute a SeqORAM “physical block”. Logical and physical block sizes
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Access dm-crypt SeqORAM HIVE [5]
Sequential Read 91 7.14 0.135
Sequential Write 88 1.5 0.016
Random Read 5.0 0.055 0.120
Random Write 4.3 0.020 014
Table 1: Throughput comparison in MB/s (higher is better). SeqORAM fea-
tures a 50x speedup over HIVE [5] for sequential reads and a 100x speedup
for sequential writes. SeqORAM random read performance is comparable to
HIVE [5].
are 4KB.
Setup. Benchmarks were conducted on Linux boxes with Intel Core i7-3520M
processors running at 2.90GHz and 6GB+ of DDR3 DRAM. The storage de-
vice of choice was a 1TB IBM 43W7622 SATA HDD running at 7200 RPM.
The average seek time and rotational latency of the disk is 9ms and 4.17ms
respectively. The data transfer rate is 300MB/s.
SeqORAM was built on a 256GB physical partition. Benchmarks were per-
formed using FileBench version 1.4.9.1 on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, kernel version
3.13.6. Results for HIVE-ORAM [5] were collected by compiling the open source
project [2] and running benchmarks with the same parameters. All tests were
run multiple times and results collected with a 95% confidence interval.
Results. Tests were performed using the sequential and random read/write
workload personalities of FileBench. Sequential accesses were measured over
a 12GB file by performing individual 1MB sequential IOs. Using a file size
twice the available DRAM (6GB here) eliminates caching effects. For ran-
dom reads/writes, individual I/O sizes were reduced to 4KB. Table 1 compares
the sequential and random read/write throughputs for SeqORAM with HIVE-
ORAM [5] and dm-crypt, a commonly used linux device mapper for full disk
encryption.
SeqORAM is almost 50x faster over HIVE-ORAM [5] for sequential reads
and 100x faster for sequential writes. Random write performance for SeqO-
RAM and HIVE-ORAM [5] are comparable while HIVE-ORAM [5] peforms
better for random reads as it features a read complexity of O(logβN) compared
to O(log2βN) for SeqORAM. However, as discussed before, modern filesystems
ensure locality sensitive data placement and thus rarely need to perform indi-
vidual random data block reads. Moreover, even for a 1TB disk logβN = 4 and
therefore the average random read complexity is log2βN/2 = 2× logβN .
Further, Figure 7 compares SeqORAM and HIVE [5] throughputs for differ-
ent sequential I/O sizes to better understand the effects of sequential accesses.
Throughputs are presented in natural log scale. As evident from Figure 7(a),
SeqORAM is almost 100x faster for sequential reads over HIVE-ORAM [5] with
8MB sequential I/Os.
A similar speedup is achieved for writes for 1MB sequential I/Os. This corre-
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sponds to the best case where the write queue contains blocks with sequentially
increasing addresses and thus only one path of the level map needs to be up-
dated. As expected, the SeqORAM write throughput plateaus under this best
case condition.
7 Conclusion
SeqORAM is a write-only ORAM with write “unlinkability” and 0 locality.
SeqORAM is implemented in the Linux kernel. SeqORAM is 100x faster over
the state-of-the-art.
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